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Abstract
Jamming attack is a serious security threat in wireless sensor networks. Therefore, it is important to frame a
mechanism to protect wireless sensor networks from various jamming attacks. Jammer intrusion detection and
jamming detection are two separate issues. In this paper, a novel jammer detection framework to detect the intrusion
of jammer and the presence of jamming in a cluster-based wireless sensor network is proposed. The proposed
framework is novel in three aspects: whenever the cluster head receives a packet, it first verifies whether the source
node is a legitimate, new node, or a jammer node. Second, when the source node is declared as a new one in the first
step, then the framework validates whether the new node is legitimate node in the previous cluster or a jammer node
by using cluster head code. Third, the framework observes the behavior of the newly joined node and the existing
nodes to identify whether the nodes in the cluster is jammed or not. Additionally, it also classifies the types of
jamming, if the presence of jamming is detected. Simulation result shows that the proposed framework performs
extremely well and achieves jamming detection rate as high as 99.88%.
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1 Introduction
Wireless sensor network encompasses small sensor nodes.
The sensor node includes sensing unit, computing unit,
communicating components, and memory [1]. Sensor
nodes are self-organized. These nodes are deployed in a
region called sensor field to sense the environment. Sen-
sor nodes are restricted by memory space, energy, and
computational power. The sensor nodes work in an infras-
tructureless and dynamically changing environment [2]
and route the collected data to the destination node for
further interpretation.
Clustering results in a two-layer hierarchy where the
cluster heads (CHs) form the higher layer and cluster
members form the lower layer. Nodes are divided into
clusters in the cluster-based wireless sensor networks.
Each cluster contains a CH and cluster members (CMs).
In a cluster, communication among CMs is carried out
through CH and communication among CHs is carried
out through the base station (BS). The CMmay leave from
a cluster and join in another cluster, and a new node may
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join in a cluster. The benefits of clustering are achiev-
ing energy efficiency by reclustering, decreasing colli-
sion, reducing the communication overhead, improving
throughput, and network lifetime [3].
The sensor network is vulnerable to jamming attacks
since the sensor nodes operate at a very low radio power
[4] and use limited communication range between source
and sink. The jammers initiate jamming attacks, and their
objective is to prevent the communication between sensor
nodes or corrupt legitimate transmissions of sensor nodes
by causing intentional packet collisions at the medium.
Therefore, wireless sensor networks are appropriate in
their hunt for jammers. The sensor networks are enor-
mously used in many applications from military to health
care [1, 3, 5, 6]. Therefore, a mechanism is required to
detect jammer intrusion and jamming in wireless sensor
network (WSN). To detect jammer intrusion and jam-
ming, first, the intrusion or entry of jammer has to be
detected (by using verification and validation algorithm)
then, jamming and its types are detected (by using audit-
ing algorithm). In this paper, a novel jammer detection
framework (which detects the intrusion of jammer and
various types of jamming attacks) is proposed and eval-
uated. In the existing literature [7–10], various jamming
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detection approaches are proposed for detecting jamming
in the wireless sensor networks. However, to the best of
our knowledge, none of the existing literature has con-
sidered the issue of jammer intrusion detection in sensor
networks. Therefore, in this paper, the main idea is both
jammer intrusion detection and jamming detection in the
cluster-based wireless sensor networks. throughout this
paper, jammer detection refers to (i) jammer intrusion
detection and (ii) jamming detection.
To understand jammer intrusion detection, it is
assumed that a legitimatemembermoves from one cluster
to another cluster. At this juncture, the jammer imperson-
ates as a legitimate member and enters into a new cluster
posing to be as legitimate member. For example, when a
member M1 moves from cluster C1 to cluster C2, then
according to existing reassociation procedure, C2 has to
validate with C1, whether M1 is a legitimate member in
C1 or not. If C2 receives a reply from C1 stating that M1
is a legitimate node in C1, then C2 ascertains that M1
is a legitimate member. At this point of time, the jam-
mer node poses to be M1 enters into the cluster C3. In
order to check the legitimateness of M1, C3 queries C1
and obviously receives a reply that M1 is a legitimate node
in C1. By posing to be a moving legitimate node, jam-
mer node cleverly enters into C3. This problem has to be
addressed. To alleviate this problem, in this paper, the idea
of cluster head code (CHC) is deployed and it is described
in Section 3.1.1. The jammer node is also referred as
rouge node within the WSN. The reason to consider the
rouge/jammer node in the WSN is given as follows: when
a member M1 moves from cluster C1 to cluster C2, the
jammer node posing to be M1 enters into the cluster C3.
After entering into C3, the jammer node can jam the
members of C3 that are within the communication range
of the jammer node.
To understand jamming detection in cluster-based
WSN, let a cluster with cluster head and cluster mem-
bers be considered. In order to detect the presence of
jamming in the network (to detect whether the cluster
members are jammed or not), a mechanism is needed
to monitor the behavior of the cluster members peri-
odically. To address this, auditing algorithm is devised
(Section 3.1.2). In the auditing algorithm, the behavior
of the members are determined periodically by using
two jamming detection metrics such as packet delivery
ratio (PDR) and received signal strength indicator (RSSI).
Auditing algorithm is implemented in CH. This algorithm
computes the PDR, maximum PDR, and malicious level
of CMs in the cluster periodically (say for every 0.1, 1,
and 3 s, respectively). PDR alone is inadequate in deter-
mining the presence of jamming. Therefore, RSSI is used
as an additional metric to detect the presence of jamming
accurately. When the maximum PDR of a CM is lower
than the PDR threshold (Section 2.5.2), then auditing
algorithm measures the RSSI of the corresponding CM.
The measured RSSI is compared with the RSSI thresh-
old (Section 2.5.2). If the measured RSSI is above the
RSSI threshold value, then auditing algorithm assigns the
malicious level as high. If the malicious level of the corre-
sponding CM is thrice consecutively determined as high,
then the auditing algorithm declares that the correspond-
ing CM is jammed. The type of jamming is also identified
if the presence of jamming is detected in the auditing
algorithm.
The primary motivation of this novel jammer detection
framework is to identify the intrusion of the jammer and
the jamming attacks in the cluster. The key ideas of this
framework are listed below:
• The proposed framework uses CH centric (network
centric) approach for detecting jamming in the
cluster-based sensor network. In this approach, the
CH estimates the metrics PDR and RSSI to make
decision about “jammed situation” or “non-jammed
situation”. The metrics PDR and RSSI for each node
under a single cluster is implicitly known to the CH,
and it is explicitly not necessary for the CH to collect
metrics from the CMs. Due to this, processing and
decision-making are carried out by the CH itself
without help from the members unlike the existing
system. In the existing system, packet send ratio
(PSR), PDR, bad packet ratio (BPR), and bit error rate
(BER) are termed as jamming induction metrics
(JIM), and they are gathered from respective nodes as
well as neighbor nodes and are based on the collected
JIM where the decision on the presence of jamming is
determined. In the proposed system, the identified
JIM metrics are PDR and RSSI. PDR and RSSI of CMs
are available within the CH itself, and it is not
required to collect this metrics elsewhere from the
CMs. Therefore, it can be claimed that the CM is not
burdened (is not loaded heavily) in the proposed
approach.
• As discussed above, in the proposed system, the
communication overhead is reduced since CH by
itself directly estimates the metrics for processing and
decision-making (CH does not depend on its
member for collecting the JIM), the communication
overhead is reduced.
• In the proposed work, a new node may join in a
cluster or an existing node may leave from a cluster.
Therefore, it supports mobility unlike the existing
system which does not support mobility. To support
this, the modified medium access control (MAC)
frame format is used. The modified frame format also
authenticates the newly joining node in the cluster
(Section 3.1.1).
The contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
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• Jamming detection metrics (Section 2.3): Jamming
detection level is bounded by threshold values of PDR
and RSSI. That is, if PDR decreases below a given
threshold value and RSSI is higher than its threshold
value, then it can be ascertained that the jamming is
present. Predicting this PDR and RSSI threshold is a
crucial task in WSN. In this paper, appropriate
statistical test (T test) is carried out to find and fix
the threshold values.
• Statistical proof (Section 2.5): By using PDR and RSSI
threshold, the presence of jamming can be
determined. However, it is not sufficient to determine
the presence of jamming alone, further it is necessary
to determine the type of jamming launched (constant
or deceptive or random or reactive jamming). In
order to find the type of jamming launched in the
network, T test is performed on the two sets viz PDR
is not affected without jamming and PDR is affected
after launching specific type of jamming. The T test
proves that there is a significant difference between
the two means. By using the mean PDR of a jammed
member as reference value, the classification of
jamming is performed (Table 1). In addition to this,
chi-square test is performed to compare the
performance of the anticipated result and the result
obtained from simulation (Table 11).
• Jammer detection framework (Section 3): The
jammer detection framework (JDF) detects the
intrusion of the jammer and various types of
jamming attacks. This framework works in three
aspects. First, it performs verification whenever a
packet is received. Next, whenever a node joins in a
cluster then the framework uses cluster head code
(CHC) in order to determine the presence of jammer
(whether the node wishes to join in a cluster that is
legitimate node or jammer node). Finally, the
framework monitors the behavior of both the existing
node and the newly joined node periodically to
determine the presence of jamming.
• Authentication using CHC (Section 3.1.1): The
proposed framework uses CHC to determine
whether the new node belongs to the available
cluster. Because the jammer node finds the loop hole
and enters into the cluster during node mobility, that
is, the jammer node may pose as a legitimate member
Table 1 Types of jamming
Types of jammer Average PDR (in %) PDR range (in %) RSSI (in db)
Constant 9.76 0–10 −93.141
Deceptive 28.81 25.6–53.5 −93.141
Random 57.9 53.6–73.75 −93.141
Reactive 22.21 11–25.5 −93.141
of other clusters and cleverly enter into the cluster as
a legitimate node.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The sys-
tem model is described in Section 2. Section 3 explains
the proposed framework in three aspects: verification,
validation, and auditing. Experiments and discussions on
the results are presented in Section 4. Related work is
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this
paper.
2 Systemmodel
In this section, different types of jamming attack mod-
els are discussed first, and then the metrics used in the
existing system are discussed. Next, the metrics used for
detecting the presence of jamming in the proposed work
is described. Finally, the system configuration is depicted
for determining the effect of various types of jamming.
2.1 Jamming attack models
The proposed work employs four types of jamming mod-
els, namely constant, deceptive, random, and reactive
jammers [7]. The constant jammers continuously gener-
ate packets on the medium to jam the communication
completely and do not obey the procedures of the MAC
layer. The deceptive jammer regularly provides packets
(not random bits) on the communication channel. It is a
dangerous type of jammer since deceptive jammer follows
the MAC layer procedure. The random jammer produces
the packets in a regular interval and switches between
jamming and sleeping. This type of jammer sleeps for a
period of RS time and jams for a period of RJ time. The
RS and RJ values may either be fixed or be in random.
As a result, the random jammer can reduce the power
consumption by switching between sleep and jam modes.
During jam period, the random jammer may operate as
constant or deceptive jammer. The reactive jammer listens
to the communication channel and generates fake packet
when transmission happens.
2.2 Jamming detection metrics in existing literature
The jamming detection metrics used in the existing lit-
erature are PSR [7], PDR [7], BPR [8, 9], signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) [8], energy consumption amount (ECA) [9],
and BER [8, 10]. The definition of these metrics are given
as follows: The PSR is measured by the source node which
is defined as the ratio of the number of packets actually
sent by the node to the number of packets intended to be
sent by the node. The PDR is computed either by source
node or destination node. The PDR is defined as the ratio
of the total number of packets successfully sent by the
node to the total number of packets sent by the node. The
BPR is computed at destination node, and it is defined
as the ratio of the number of bad packets received by a
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node to the total number of packets arrived at destina-
tion node. The SNR is defined as the ratio of the received
signal power in a node to the received noise power in a
node. The ECA is defined as the amount of energy con-
sumed in a particular time for a wireless sensor network.
The BER is computed as the ratio of the number of dam-
aged bits to the number of total bits received by a node for
the duration of a transmission session.
The metrics PSR and PDR are used in [7] to identify
the jamming attack. From the results, it is observed that
the PSR and PDR encounter problems in deciding about
jamming and its types. Then, two algorithms are devised
(signal strength consistency check and location consis-
tency check). The first algorithm uses the PDR and signal
strength in order to determine the presence of jamming.
The second algorithm uses the PDR and location of its
neighbors to determine the presence of jamming. The
estimation of PSR is a complex task. Additionally, this
approach needs localization technique or hardware such
as GPS to identify the neighbor’s location. The BPR and
the SNRmetrics are used in [8] to detect various jamming
attacks. The approach used in [8] causes communication
overhead since every node in the network has to report the
data periodically to the BS. The metrics PDR, BPR, and
ECA are used in [9] to detect the presence of jamming.
The BPR and ECA are estimated by nodes; accordingly,
the nodes are burdened. The metrics BER and RSS are
used in [10] for detecting jamming attacks. But it is diffi-
cult to compute the BER by a sensor node, since a sensor
node needs to collect a huge amount of data. This method
cannot classify various types of jamming attacks. It is clear
from the existing jamming detection metrics that there is
no metric or combination of metrics that determines jam-
ming and its types in both physical and data link layer.
Therefore, a kind of jamming detection metric and its
suitability in WSN are needed to be explored.
2.3 Jamming detection metrics in the proposed system
In the proposed system, the jamming detection metrics,
namely PDR and RSSI, are selected for detecting the pres-
ence of jamming in a wireless sensor network. The PDR
alone is not sufficient to detect the presence of jam-
ming. Therefore, it is essential to consider an additional
metric to detect the presence of jamming and different
types of jamming correctly. The metric RSSI is consid-
ered as an additional metric as discussed in Section 2.2.
The advantages of selecting these metrics are discussed as
follows:
1. The PDR is an excellent metric since the CH can
measure it by itself accurately without much
computational overhead, and PDR can identify the
presence of all types of jamming attacks both at
physical and data link layers.
2. The CH can easily measure RSSI either by using
formulae as per the chosen propagation model (in
the proposed work, free-space propagation model is
chosen) or by the node’s RF power meter.
3. In the proposed system (Section 3), the CH estimates
the metrics (PDR, RSSI) and makes decision about
“jammed situation” or “non-jammed situation”. The
metrics PDR and RSSI for each node under a single
cluster is known to the CH implicitly, and it is
explicitly not needed for the CH to collect the metrics
from the nodes. Due to this, processing and decision-
making are done by the CH itself without needing
help from the members. Therefore, it can be claimed
that the CM is not burdened (is not loaded heavily).
4. In the proposed system, the metrics PDR and RSSI
are used in detecting the presence of jamming and its
types to an extend of 99.9 %. The metrics PDR and
RSSI are defined in the next section. The suitability
of considering these metrics in the WSN
environment is illustrated in Section 2.5.
2.4 Description of PDR and RSSI
This section describes the metrics that are used in this
paper to detect the presence of jamming attack. The met-
rics PDR and RSSI are considered in the proposed system.
The PDR is computed by a source node (CH). The PDR is
defined as the ratio of the total number of packets success-
fully (the packets for which acknowledgement is received)
sent by the node to the total number of packets sent by the
node. The PDR is expressed as follows:
PDR = Pss/Ps (1)
where Pss is number of packets successfully sent by the
source, Ps is the total number of packets sent at the source.
The RSSI is defined as the ratio of received signal strength
to the reference power. The received signal strength value












where RPr is the remaining power at the receiver, TPs is
the transmitted power at the sender, Gt is the gain of the
transmitter, Gr is the gain of the receiver, β is wave length,
d is distance between the sender and receiver, and Pref is
the reference power.
2.5 Statistical proof
In this section, it is essential to determine first whether
various types of jamming influence PDR or not by per-
forming the statistical test (T test). Next, T test is used to
fix the PDR threshold. The T test proves that there is a
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significant difference between the two population means
(i.e., observed PDR during jamming-free scenario and
observed PDR after the launching of jamming). By using
the mean of samples, the PDR threshold is fixed. Lastly, by
using PDR and RSSI threshold, the presence of jamming
is determined. However, it is not sufficient to determine
the presence of jamming alone, but further it is neces-
sary to determine the type of jamming launched (constant
or deceptive or random or reactive jamming). In order to
find the type of jamming launched in the network, T test
is performed on the two sets viz observed PDR during
jamming-free scenario and observed PDR after launching
a specific type of jamming. The T test proves that there
is a significant difference between the two means. There-
fore, by using the mean PDR of the jammed member as
reference value, the types of jamming are classified (all the
T tests are performed by using samples obtained from our
simulation).
2.5.1 Jamming and PDR
The T test is performed to verify whether the jamming
infuences PDR or not by using few samples. The simu-
lation is carried out in Section 4. At first, the constant
jamming is commenced. Then, two group of samples are
taken from the simulation with respect to the absence and
presence of jamming in the sensor network. The T test is
done on these samples to signify whether there is a vari-
ation between the two population means (that is, PDR is
not affected during the absence and presence of jamming)
or not. Similarly, the simulation is repeated for other types
of jamming.
The null hypothesis signifies that there is no differ-
ence between the two population means (i.e., PDR is not
affected during the absence and presence of jamming).
The alternate hypothesis signifies that there is a differ-
ence between the two population means (i.e., PDR is not
affected in the absence of jamming and PDR is affected in
the presence of jamming).
T test is done on 40 samples (20 samples in the absence
of jamming and 20 samples in the presence of jamming)
of PDR acquired from the CMs, CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4,
and CM5. The degree of freedom (df ) is computed as 38
(s1 + s2 − 2), and the significance level (p) is 0.001 with
the corresponding t values 49.2, 68.7, 72.2, 0.6, and 2.1 for
99.9% of confidence interval. s1 indicates the total num-
ber of samples measured in the absence of jamming, and
s2 denotes the total number of samples in the presence of
constant jamming. The result passes the t test. The t value
of members CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5 is 49.2,
68.7, 72.2, 0.6, and 2.1, respectively. The t table value of
T test is 3.65. It is identified that the t value of the CMs,
CM1, CM2, and CM3, exceeds the table value. This sig-
nifies that the PDR of CM1, CM2, and CM3 is reduced
due to jamming, whereas the members CM4 and CM5
are not affected by constant jamming. Thus, it proves the
significance of alternate hypothesis for constant jamming.
The level of significance is 0.001. This indicates that the
reliability of the result is 99.9%, i.e., the obtained result
is considered to be correct by 99.9% and the chance of
attained result to be wrong is 0.1%. Similarly, the T test is
repeated for other types of jamming (deceptive, random,
and reactive).
2.5.2 PDR and RSSI threshold
PDR is employed to realize the incidence of jamming.
Therefore, it is necessary to identify the association
between PDR and jamming. It is well known that jamming
is inversely proportionate to PDR. An analysis is done to
find out the snapping point at which the jammer influ-
ences the PDR to decrease. In the proposed system, the
snapping point at which the jammer influences the PDR
to diminish is fixed as the threshold value (in simulation)
to forecast the presence of jamming.
CH periodically monitors the PDR. If the computed
PDR is lesser than the PDR threshold, then CH will state
that jamming has taken place. The test is done with four
samples of PDR acquired from CMs CM1, CM2, CM3,
CM4, and CM5 to fix the threshold. The degree of free-
dom is 3, and the significance level (p) is 0.001 with the
corresponding t value at 13.1 for 99.9% of confidence
interval. The result passes the t test. The t table value of T
test is 12.92. It is identified that the t value (13.1) exceeds
the t table value (12.92). This shows that there is signifi-
cance and therefore the PDR threshold (PDR threshold) is
fixed as 74.75.
The factors other than jamming such as collision and
congestion can also influence the data transmission and
cause the PDR value to become low. Therefore, PDR is
used in conjunction with RSSI in order to detect the
presence of jamming. The CH frequently measures the
RSSI value and fixes the RSSI threshold. If the CH esti-
mates lower PDR value than the PDR threshold, then CH
also compares an estimated RSSI value against the RSSI
threshold. If the observed PDR value is lower than the
PDR threshold and the RSSI value is higher than the RSSI
threshold, then it can be ascertained that the node is
jammed. The average RSSI (db) threshold (RSSI threshold)
value is fixed as −93.141 for 20m [12].
2.5.3 Types of jamming
The CH compares the observed PDR and RSSI against
the PDR range and RSSI as shown in the Table 1 to
make a distinction between various types of jamming.
Table 1 consists of three fields such as average PDR, PDR
range, and RSSI. The average PDR represents the aver-
age PDR value of CMs CM1, CM2, and CM3 from the
T test of various types of jamming (for example, in the
constant jamming, the average PDR value is considered
Perumal et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:35 Page 6 of 25
as discussed in Section 2.5.1. Similarly, the experiment is
repeated for other types of jamming). The PDR range for
various types of jamming is considered from the T test
(in simulation). For example, in the constant jamming, the
PDR range is considered as in Section 2.5.1. Similarly, the
experiment is repeated for other types of jamming. The
RSSI is fixed as discussed in Section 2.5.2.
2.6 System configuration
The system set-up consists of four clusters and a BS as
shown in the Fig. 1. Each cluster consists of six nodes
(one CH and five CMs). The communication range of
each node in the network is 20m. CM communicates with
other CMs in a cluster through CH andCHs communicate
with other CHs through BS. CMmoves between clusters.
To illustrate the proposed system, a jammer is launched
deliberately in the cluster CH21. The proposed system is
installed in the CH and BS. To understand the interac-
tions of the jamming detection metrics (Section 2.3) and
to measure the impact of a jammer in various scenarios
(Section 4.2), simulations are performed as per described
in Section 4. The simulation is done by using variousmod-
els as discussed in Section 2.1. In the simulation, a jammer
is launched in the first cluster (CH 21). This cluster con-
sists of a cluster head (CH21) and five members such as
CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5. From the simulation
result, it is observed that CH21 identifies that the mem-
bers CM1, CM2, and CM3 are jammed and the members
CM4 and CM5 are not jammed. It is also evident from the
simulation result that the CH has the ability to make a dis-
tinction between various types of jamming (Section 2.5.3).
Based on the simulation, it is justified that the CH has the
Fig. 1Wireless sensor network with a jammer node. The node in black
box indicates CH, the nodes without box specify CMs, and the red node
represents the jammer node. The line indicates a communication
between CH and CM. The arrow denotes communication between
CHs and BS. The CH21and members 1 to 5, CH22 and members 6–10,
CH23 and members 11–15, and CH24 and members 16–20 are
divided into four clusters, respectively. The nodes with colored box
indicate jammed members
ability to identify the jammed members and BS has the
ability to identify the jammed CHs.
3 Jammer detection framework
In this section, first, innovation, research idea, and
description of the problem statement are described. Next,
the modules in the jammer detection framework such
as verification and validation (jammer intrusion detec-
tion) as well as auditing (jamming detection) are dis-
cussed. Then, the databank used in the proposed system
is defined. Finally, verification and validation steps as well
as auditing step of the jammer detection framework are
described.
The important innovation,research idea, and the
description of the problem statement of this article are
listed in the following. In spite of this, the motivation,
objective, and contribution of the paper is well described
in Section 1.
1. In the existing literature [7–10], several jamming
detection approaches were proposed for flatWSN. In [13],
the authors proposed jamming detection approach for
cluster-based WSN. Thus, in the existing literature, only
jamming detection is carried out. The issue of jamming
detection is completely different from jammer detection.
Jamming detection refers to the detection of the presence
or absence of jamming in the network. Jammer intru-
sion detection or simply jammer detection refers to the
detection or identification of the entry of jammer node
in the cluster. To the best of our knowledge, none of
the existing literature has considered the issue of jammer
intrusion detection or jammer detection in cluster-based
WSN. Therefore, in this paper, the main idea is to first
detect the jammer intrusion into the cluster (Section 3.1.1:
verification and validation algorithm) and then to per-
form jamming detection in the cluster in the cluster-based
WSN (Section 3.1.2: auditing algorithm). The proposed
system works in two aspects: first, it prevents the entry
of jammer into the cluster and, second, it continuously
monitors the members inside the cluster to determine
whether the members are jammed or not. That is, first,
the proposed JDF prevents the entry of the jammer into
the cluster. But due to any unexplained or unaddressed
random error, if the jammer enters into the cluster then,
a monitoring mechanism is needed to monitor the cluster
member to determine whether the members are jammed
or not. To address this, the cluster head of the proposed
system performs jamming detection inside the cluster.
Therefore, the proposed JDF comprises two components:
verification and validation algorithm for jammer intrusion
detection and auditing algorithm for jamming detection
within the cluster member.
2. The threshold value and/or the parameter of the jam-
ming detection metrics in the existing literatures is set
up based on the reference value published in [7]. Unlike
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in existing literatures, in the proposed system, statistical
test (T test) is performed for the following: (i) To examine
and determine the appropriate jamming detection metric
(among PDR, PSR, RSSI) for identifying the presence of
jamming (Section 2.5.1), (ii) to find the threshold value of
PDR (Section 2.5.2), and (iii) to classify various types of
jamming (Section 2.5.3).
3. In this paper, a performance metric called unde-
tection ratio (UDR) is introduced. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing literature had defined and
used this metric UDR. UDR explains that the CH does
not detects a node as abnormal when the node is really
jammed (that is, the CH does not detect the jammed
node or CH fails to detect a jammed node). The detailed
explanation is given below.
The reason behind choosing the metric UDR in this
paper is explained as follows: in the existing literature,
false positive rate or false discovery ratio or false detec-
tion ratio (FDR) was used and defined as the ratio of the
number of nodes incorrectly identified by the system to
the number of nodes actually falling under that group.
There is no clear definition of false detection in the exist-
ing literature. In general, there are two scenarios in false
detection: (i) detects a node as abnormal though that node
is normal (false positive) and (ii) does not detect a node
as abnormal when the node is jammed (false negative). It
is found from the existing literature that the FDR denotes
the first scenario (false positive), and there is no explana-
tion about the second scenario (false negative). Therefore,
in this paper, the detection of sensor nodes is classified
into (i) true detection, (ii) false detection, and (iii) unde-
tection. True detection, false detection, and undetection
are based on true positive, false positive, and false nega-
tive, respectively. In true detection, the CH detects a node
as abnormal when the node is jammed. In false detection,
the CH faultily detects a node as abnormal though that
node is normal. In undetection, the CH does not detects
a node as abnormal when the node is really jammed (that
is, the CH does not detect the jammed node or CH fails to
detect a jammed node) (Section 4.3).
For example, consider there are ten nodes in which five
nodes are jammed and five nodes are normal.
• In first scenario, if the jamming detection system
detects five nodes as jammed when five nodes are
really jammed, then the TDR is computed as 1 (that
is, 5/5 = 1). The system neither detects a node as
abnormal though that node is normal nor detects a
node as normal when the node is jammed. Hence, the
FDR and UDR are computed as 0.
• In second scenario, in real scenario, five nodes are
jammed out of six nodes. In the simulation, if the
system detects six nodes as jammed when only four
nodes are really jammed, then the TDR is computed
as 0.8 (that is, 4/4 + 1 = 0.8). (That is, the number of
correctly detected jammed nodes/the number of
correctly detected jammed nodes + the number of
nodes that are detected as not jammed but they are
actually jammed). In this scenario, the FDR is
computed as 0.4 (that is, 2/(2 + 3) = 0.2). (That is,
the number of nodes are detected as jammed but they
are normal/the number of nodes that are detected as
jammed but they are normal + the number of
correctly detected normal nodes, but the nodes are
normal). In this scenario, the UDR is computed as 0.2
(that is, 1/(4 + 1) = 0.2. That is, the number of
nodes that are detected as normal but they are
abnormal/ the number of correctly detected jammed
nodes + the number of nodes that are detected as
normal but they are abnormal).
For a fair jamming detection system, the TDR must be
equal to 1 and FDR and UDR must be equal to 0.
3.1 Jammer detection framework model
The JDF is proposed for cluster-based wireless sensor
networks. The main idea of the JDF is to perform both
jammer intrusion detection by using verification and val-
idation, and jamming detection using auditing. Figure 2
illustrates the key modules of the framework.
The JDF is implemented in all CH/BS. When this
framework receives a packet, then it detects whether the
source node is a legitimate node or jammer node or
new node using three steps namely: (1) verification, (2)
validation, and (3) auditing. Every CH has to maintain
look-up tables for verification, validation, and auditing.
The look-up tables employed in JDF are cluster mem-
ber and head (CMH) table, jammer table, CHC table,
cluster member CHC (CM_CHC) table, flag table, PDR
table, maximum PDR (MaxPDR) table, and malicious
table. All these look up tables are kept inside a data
bank.
The verification step (first step) in JDF uses the MH
table and Jammer table. The main intention to maintain
the MH table and jammer table is to determine the type
of source node and identify whether the source node is a
legitimate node, new node, or a jammer node. When the
source node moves from one cluster to another, then val-
idation step (second step) in the JDF has to authenticate
whether the source node belongs to any of the available
cluster or not. In order to authenticate the source node
and to determine the presence of a jammer node, the val-
idation step maintains two tables such as CHC table and
CM_CHC table. In order to monitor the behavior of CMs,
the auditing step (third step) in the JDF maintains four
tables such as flag table, PDR table, MaxPDR table, and
malicious table. The tables used in the auditing step are
not shown in Fig. 2.
Perumal et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:35 Page 8 of 25
Fig. 2 Jammer detection framework. The framework represents three steps: verification, validation, auditing, and the databank. The databank
consists of various look-up tables used by this framework
The description and use of each table is explained as
follows:
1. The CMH table contains two fields: Node ID and
node type as shown in Table 2. The node ID
represents the identity (address) of the nodes. Node
type represents the type of the source node (CH, CM,
or BS). The objective of this table is to determine the
type of the source node.
2. The Jammer table includes two fields such as S.No.
and node ID as shown in Table 3. The S.No.
represents the corresponding records’ entry number.
The node ID represents the identity (address) of the
jammer node. The source node is declared as jammer
node, if address of the source node is found in the
jammer table.
Table 2 CMH table









3. The CHC table is formed by two fields namely:
cluster heads and CHC as shown in Table 4. The
cluster heads field denotes the CHs available in the
network. The CHC represents each CH’s CHC
(Section 3.1.1). This table is used by each CH to
authenticate the source node, when a source node
moves from one cluster to the other or when a
source node wishes to join in a cluster.
4. The CM_CHC table includes two fields such as
cluster head and CHC as shown in Table 5. The
cluster head represents the CH in which the
corresponding CM has been associated. The CHC
denotes the CHC provided by the CH in which the
corresponding CM is associated.
5. The flag table contains two fields, namely CM_N and
flag, as shown in the Table 6. The CM_N field
represents the address of the members in the cluster,
and flag represents either the value T or F, where T
denotes a successful delivery of a packet of the
corresponding CM and F denotes an unsuccessful (F
is determined if there is no acknowledgement within
the specified time interval) delivery of a packet. The
JDF updates the flag entry with the value either T or
F in this table.
Table 3 Jammer table
S.No. Node ID
1 25
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6. The PDR table consists of two fields such as CM_N
and CM_PDR as shown in Table 7. The CM_N field
denotes the address of the CM and the CM_PDR
field represent the packet delivery ratio of each
member in the cluster. The JDF computes this
CM_PDR value periodically (every 0.1 s) by observing
the entries from Table 6.
7. The MaxPDR table is formed by two fields such as
CM_N and CM_MPDR as shown in Table 8. The
CM_N field represents the address of the CM, and
CM_MPDR represents the maximum packet delivery
ratio of each member in the cluster. The JDF
calculates this CM_MPDR value periodically (every
1 s) by observing the entries from Table 7.
8. The malicious table contains three fields such as
entry no., CM_N, and level as shown in Table 9. The
entry no. field represents records’ entry number. The
CM_N field represents the address of the CM, and
level denotes the malicious level of each member in
the cluster. The JDF computes the value of Level
periodically (every 3 s) by observing the entries from
Table 8 and expresses the value as high, normal, and
low. In order to do this, the following three rules are
followed:
1. If MaxPDR.MPDR is lesser than
PDR_Threshold and RSSI is greater than
RSSI_Threshold, then its malicious level is
assigned as high.
2. If MaxPDR.MPDR is equal to
PDR_Threshold, then its malicious level is
assigned as normal.
3. If MaxPDR.MPDR is greater than
PDR_Threshold, then its malicious level is
assigned as low, where MaxPDR.MPDR
represents the maximum value of PDR from
the corresponding entries of each member in
the cluster (every 1 s).
The verification step verifies whether the source node is
CM, BS, a new node, or a jammer node by referring the
Table 5 CM_CHC table
Cluster head CHC
21 5
Table 6 Flag table






MH table and Jammer table. If the source node is autho-
rized as a legitimate node by the framework, then the
framework proceeds with auditing step (step three). Or
else, if the source node is found in the jammer table, then
the framework declares the source node as the jammer
node. Otherwise, the framework declares the source node
as a new node (source node is not found in the jammer
table) and proceeds with the validation step (step two).
The validation step performs the following function. If
the source node is declared as a new node in the verifica-
tion step, then the CHC is used to determine whether the
new node belongs to any of the available CH or not. If the
source node belongs to any of the available cluster then,
the framework proceeds with auditing step (step three).
Otherwise, the framework declares the source node as the
jammer node and proceeds with the auditing step.
The third step of the framework is the auditing step. The
auditing step determines the behavior of the members in a
cluster by observing the CM’s PDR and RSSI periodically.
In order to do this, the framework maintains the follow-
ing tables viz: flag, PDR, MaxPDR, and malicious table.
The observed PDR and RSSI values are stored in these
tables (Section 3.1.2). The observed PDR and RSSI val-
ues are compared with their respective thresholds. If the
behavior of a member is found as unusual (if PDR is lower
than its threshold and RSSI is greater than its threshold as
explained in Section 3.1.2), then the member is declared
as jammed.
3.1.1 Verification and validation
The responsibility of verification and validation algorithm
is to detect the jammer intrusion in the cluster-based
WSN. The first step of the framework is the verification
step. The verification step is responsible for making deci-
sion about whether the source node is a legitimate node, a
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new node, or a jammer node. The verification step refers
to the CMH table and jammer table as shown in Tables 2
and 3, respectively.
The second step of the framework is the validation
step. This step has to authenticate whether the new node
(declared as new node by step one) belongs to any of the
available CH or not. Validation is used as security mech-
anism to perform authentication. For this, validation step
uses the CHC.
If the node belongs to any of the available CH (that is, if
this step receives valid CHC from new node as response),
then this step declares the new node as legitimate node.
If this step does not receive or invalid CHC from a new
node as response, then it declares the new node as jammer
node.
The main intention to use the CHC is to determine
whether the new node belongs to the available cluster or
not. Because when a legitimate nodemoves from one clus-
ter to another cluster, the jammer node finds this as a loop
hole and enters into yet another cluster by impersonating
the moving legitimate node. That is, jammer node may
pose as a legitimate member of other cluster and clev-
erly enter into yet another cluster as legitimate node. The
example of this scenario is discussed below.
The CHC is deployed to avoid the jammer intrusion
in the network. The modified 802.15.4 MAC and beacon
are used for distribution of CHC to CMs and other CHs,
updation of CHC in CMs and CHs, recovery of CHC,
Table 9 Malicious table











and to perform the process of node authentication. The
data authentication is out of the scope of authorŠs objec-
tive. Therefore, the data authentication approaches are
not discussed in this paper.
CHC is simply a random sequence number but if this
CHC is broadcasted in clear by the CH to CMs, then the
jammer node may see this CHC and use it to enter into
another cluster by impersonating like a legitimate CM.
Therefore, CHC should be broadcasted securely to CMs.
To alleviate this problem, the technique proposed in [14,
15] can be applied along with the JDF.
The motivating factor behind the use of CHC, to
authenticate a new node in the validation step is discussed
by comparing the reassociation of cluster members in the
existing and the proposed system.
• In existing approach, if a CM moves from one cluster
to another cluster, then reassociation procedure is
carried out. The process of reassociation in the
existing approach is illustrated by using the scenarios
shown in Fig. 1.
• In Fig. 1, it is assumed that the CM6 likes to join in
the CH24 from CH22. According to the existing
reassociation procedure, CH24 validates whether
CM6 is a member of CH22 by querying CH22. If
CH22 replies that the CM6 is a legitimate member,
then CH24 can complete the validation step by
stating CM6 as a legitimate member. Finally, CM6
joins CH24.
• During this scenario, when CM6 moves from CH22
to CH24. The jammer node finds loop hole and
enters into the picture. At this junction, the jammer
node poses to be CM6 and can send joining or join
request to CH21. Then, according to the existing
reassociation procedure, CH21 has to validate with
CH22. For this, CH21 queries CH22 by asking
whether CM6 is a legitimate member in CH22. CH22
replies that CM6 is a legitimate member. Posing to be
CM6, cleverly the jammer node enters into CH21.
Although the CM6 has become a member in CH24,
the jammer posing to be as CM6 has become a
member in CH21. That is, unfortunately, CH21
allows jammer node to join with it. This problem has
to be corrected. To alleviate this problem, in the
proposed JDF, the CHC is used to authenticate a
newer node.
• The overall idea of implementing the authentication
(validation) is achieved by using CHC and is described
based on the following steps: (i) formation of CHC,
(ii) distribution of CHC to CMs, (iii) distribution of
CHC to CHs, (iv) updating of CHC in CMs, (v)
updating of CHC in CHs, (vi) recovery of CHC by
CH if the CHC is lost, and (vii) authentication. Now,
each one is discussed in detail as follows:
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1. Initially, every CH has to generate CHC. CHC
is a random number. The generated CHC is
stored in the CHC table as shown in Table 4.
The CHC table consists of information such as
the identifier of every CH available in the
network and the CHC of the corresponding
CHs. Then, the CH broadcasts the generated
CHC to its CMs and also to all the CHs in the
network through BS. In order to do this, it
uses augmented beacon frame and MAC
frame of IEEE 802.15.4. The CHC is generated
periodically by the CHs to protect the CHC
from the jammer. In order to protect the
CHC, the security mechanism discussed in
[14, 15] can be used. However, in this paper,
the security mechanism discussed in [14] is
implemented along with JDF. So this protects
the CHC from eavesdropping, snooping,
interception, and modification attacks.
2. In order to provide the generated CHC to all
its members, CH broadcasts a beacon frame to
its members. The beacon frame says to all the
CMs that the subsequent MAC frame includes
CHC.
3. In order to provide the generated CHC to
other CHs available in the network, the CHC
is put into MAC frame as payload and is sent
to all CHs available in the network via BS.
4. If the CM receives the MAC frame, then the
CM extracts the CHC. The extracted CHC is
stored in the CM CHC table as shown in
Table 5.
5. If the other CHs receive MAC frame, then the
CHs extract the CHC. The extracted CHC is
stored in the CHC table as shown in Table 4.
6. It is necessary for the CH to recover the CHC,
if the CHC is lost. To obtain the CHC, the CH
requests for CHC from the corresponding CH.
Based on the reception of the request from the
requested CH, the corresponding CH
responses with its CHC. Now, the
corresponding CH stores the received CHC in
Table 4.
7. In the verification step (step one), if a source
node is declared as a new node, then the CH
demands CHC from the source node by
sending beacon frame. Based on reception of
the beacon frame, the source node replies with
its CHC. Now, the CH compares the received
CHC against the entry available in the CHC
table (Table 4). If the received CHC is
matched with an entry available in Table 4,
then the source node belongs to the available
CHs. Otherwise, the source node is declared
as a jammer node. Then, it proceeds with the
auditing step. Because the newly joined node
or the existing node in a cluster has a chance
to become a jammer node in the future. The
CHC is incorporated in the MAC frame
format. To implement this, the 802.15.4 MAC
frame format and beacon frame format are
modified (i.e., the reserved field in the MAC
and beacon frame format is utilized to
incorporate the CHC) as follows:
• The MAC frame payload can hold the random
number which represents CHC.
• The two bits of MAC frame reserved field can hold
the value between 0 and 3. From the values 0, 1, 2, and
3, the values 0 and 1 are used. The value 0 denotes
that the CH provides its CHC to other CHs, and the
value 1 denotes that the respective CH demands for
CHC from other cluster heads through BS.
• Beacon frame reserved field will consist of the value
either 1or 0. The value 1 denotes that the CH will
provide its CHC in the MAC frame. The value 0
denotes that CH demands for CHC from its member
or new node.
3.1.2 Auditing
The former step is responsible for declaring whether the
source node is a jammer node or it belongs to any of
the available cluster. The auditing step is responsible for
monitoring the existing members behavior and a newly
joined member. The auditing step decides whether the
newly joined member or existing members are in nor-
mal state or unusual state depending on their behavior.
This uses PDR and RSSI to find out the behavior of
members.
Jamming detection and jamming classification are dif-
ferent modules in the auditing algorithm. The auditing
algorithm detects the presence of jamming, and if jam-
ming is present, then the classification is performed based
on various types of jamming. Classification of jamming
cannot be performed before identifying the presence of
jamming. Therefore, in the proposed JDF, first, jamming
is detected (based on the results of statistical test), and
then if jamming is present, classification of jamming is
done (based on the results of statistical test). Thus, sta-
tistical tests are employed for both jamming detection
and classification but the methodology followed for jam-
ming detection and classification is completely different
as detailed below.
The CM_PDR and CM_MPDR of each CM is calcu-
lated by CH as shown in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.
The CM_PDR is computed periodically (every 0.1 s) by
referring the Table 6 and the measured CM_PDR is
stored in Table 7. The CM_MPDR is computed (every
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1 s) by observing the CM_PDR entries from Table 7
and computed CM_MPDR is stored in Table 8. If the
CM_MPDR is above or equivalent to the PDR threshold,
then JDF ascertains the member’s behavior as low or nor-
mal and declares that the member is not jammed (usual).
If the CM_MPDR is lower than the PDR threshold, then
JDF directly cannot justify that the corresponding CM is
jammed. Because the PDR may be affected by other fac-
tors. Therefore, PDR alone is inadequate to determine
the presence of jamming. It is necessary to use an addi-
tional metric RSSI (RSSI threshold is fixed as discussed in
Section 2.5.2) to detect the presence of jamming correctly.
When the CM_MPDR is lower than the PDR threshold,
then JDF measures the RSSI of the corresponding CM.
The measured RSSI is compared against the RSSI thresh-
old. If themeasured RSSI is above the RSSI threshold, then
JDF assigns the malicious level (level) as high. If the mali-
cious level of the corresponding CM is determined as high
for three times, then the corresponding CM is declared as
jammed.
In addition to jamming detection, the auditing algo-
rithm also performs classification of jamming. The type
of jamming is identified if the presence of jamming is
detected in the auditing algorithm. The classification
of jamming is done by comparing the observed max-
imum PDR value (from Table 8: MaxPDR table) with
the PDR range (from Table 1: types of jamming table in
Section 2.5.3). The PDR range for various types of jam-
ming is formulated from the T test. The PDR range is
estimated with the probability 0.001, and the PDR range
varies based on various probabilities. The auditing algo-
rithm used in the auditing step for detecting the presence




1. Snooze till the timer elapses (for every 0.1 s)
2. i = 1
3. While (i ≤ m) (m denotes the total number of
members in a cluster)
. 1. Find an entry equivalent to CM_Ni from flag table
(Table 6)
. 2. Calculate the CM_PDR of each CM_Ni from the
found entry
. 3. Modify the calculated CM_PDR in PDR (Table 7)
. 4. Increment : i = i + 1
4. End while
5. Return
Evaluation of maximum PDR
1. Snooze till the timer elapses (for every 1 s)
2. i = 1
3. While (i ≤ m) (m denotes the total number of
members in a cluster)
. 1. Find an entry equivalent to CM_Ni from PDR
table (Table 6)
. 2. Calculate the CM_MPDR of each CM_Ni from the
found entry
. 3. Modify the calculated CM_MPDR in MaxPDR
(Table 7)
. 4. Increment : i = i + 1
4. End while
5. Return
Evaluation of maliciousness level
1. Snooze till the timer elapses (for every 3 s)
2. Set E = 1 (E denotes the records entry number in
Table 9)
3. j = 1
4. while(j ≤ 3)
. 1. while (i ≤ m)
. 1. Find an entry equivalent to CM_Ni from
MaxPDR table (Table 8)
. 2. If (MaxPDR.CM_MPDR < PDR_Threshold)
. 1. CH estimates the RSSI of corresponding
CM
. 2. If (RSSI > RSSI_Threshold)
. 1. Malilcious.Level = High
(Malicious.Level as in Table 9)
. 3. If (MaxPDR.MPDR = PDR_Threshold)
. 1. Malicious.Level = Normal
. 4. If (MaxPDR.MPDR > PDR_Threshold)
. 1. Malicious.Level = Low
. 5. Modify the Malicious.Level in entry (E) of
malicious table (Table 9)
. 6. Increment the value of E by one
. 2. End while




1. Snooze till the timer elapses (for every 3 s to detect
the jammed node)
2. i = 1
3. while(i ≤ m)
. 1. For every entry in the malicious Table (Table 9)
. 1. Find an entry that is same as CM_Ni from
Table 9
. 2. If (Malicious.Level is High)
. 1. Declare CM_Ni is jammed
. 2. Invoke jamming classification ()
3. Return
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Jamming classification :
1. Jamming classification ()
2. If (MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≥ 0 and
MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≤ 10)
. 1.declares that the constant jamming is performed
3. If (MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≥ 11 and
MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≤ 25.5)
. 1.declares that the reactive jamming is performed
4. If (MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≥ 25.6 and
MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≤ 53.50)
. 1.declares that the deceptive jamming is performed
5. If (MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≥ 53.6 and
MaxPDR.CM_MPDR ≤ 74.75)
. 1.declares that the random jamming is performed
6. Return
In the auditing algorithm, evaluation of PDR, maxi-
mum PDR, maliciousness level, and jamming identifica-
tion/jamming classification are run concurrently in order
to detect the presence of jamming and classify them. It
is observed that the CH by itself computes the metrics,
processes, and makes decision about “jammed situation”
or “non-jammed situation”. Therefore, the CMs are not
loaded for evaluation of jamming detection metrics such
as PDR and RSSI, processing, and decision-making unlike
the existing approaches.
3.1.3 Posterior action on jamming
The novel jammer detection framework is proposed to
detect the intrusion of jammer and the presence of
jamming in the cluster-based wireless sensor network.
The proposed system detects jammer intrusion and jam-
ming, but it does not describe the post-characterization
action in the WSN. The post-characterization action
is out of scope of the author’s objective. In order to
carry out the post-characterization action, the existing
defense/countermeasure technique described in [16–22]
can be applied along with JDF.
4 Experiments and discussion
4.1 Simulation setup
Firstly, a cluster of six members (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5,
and CH21) are considered including CH as shown in the
Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, it is identified that the CMs M1, M2, and
M3 are jammed. The cluster head CH21 and CMsM4 and
M5 are not jammed. The CH identifies about jammed and
non-jammed members, whereas identification of jammed
CHs or non-jammed CHs are performed by BS. Then, dif-
ferent types of jammer are integrated to analyze the traffic
in normal scenario and jamming scenario (Section 4.2). In
Fig. 1, three members (M1, M2, and M3) are affected by a
jammer and two members (M4 and M5) are not affected
by a jammer. The input parameter details are used for
simulation with respect to the sensor networks as given in
Table 10.
4.2 Discussions
The simulation is done for 600 s as given in Table 10. At
the outset, the simulation is carried out by excluding the
jammer. After that, the simulation is continued with dif-
ferent types of jammers. (Initially, the constant jammer
is launched, then a set of samples is considered without
jamming and after launching of jamming in the network.
Similarly, the simulation is repeated for other types of
jamming).
To illustrate the normal scenario and jamming scenario
with different types of jammers, five set of samples of PDR
are taken from the simulation results. In Figs. 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, and 8, the X-axis denotes the cluster members and the
Y -axis denotes PDR. The variety of color bars in Fig. 3
indicates different PDR samples (samples are taken from
the simulation results) during normal scenario (when jam-
mers are not introduced). From Fig. 3, it is evident that
the PDR of every cluster members in the normal sce-
nario is greater than the PDR threshold. Next, various
jammers such as constant, deceptive, random, and reac-
tive are introduced in the sensor network. The varieties of
color bars in Figs. 4, 5, 6, and 7 indicate different types of
jamming (constant, deceptive, random, and reactive). The
simulation setup for this scenario is made in such a way
that three CMs (CM1, CM2, and CM3) are affected by the
jammer and two CMs (CM4 and CM5) are not affected
by a jammer. The PDR distribution of cluster members
during different types of jamming: with PDR threshold at
74.75% and with the probability of 0.001 (Section 2.5.1),
with PDR threshold at 77% and with the probability of
0.01 (Section 4.3), with PDR threshold at 73.75% and with
the probability of 0.05 (Section 4.3), with PDR threshold
at 62.5% with the probability of 0.1 (Section 4.3) is shown
in Figs. 4, 5, 6, and 7, respectively. From the figures, it is
Table 10 Simulation setup
Parameters WSN Jammer
No. of nodes 5, 50, and 100 1
Sensor nodes MRF24J40 MRF24J40
Mode of transmission Simplex unicast Simplex broadcast
Packet size 1024 bytes Variable
Transmission rate 20–100 packets/s Variable
Transmission range (m) 20 20
Propagation model Free space Free space
Simulation time (s) 600 600
MAC protocol None None
Jammer type – Constant, deceptive,
random, and reactive
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Fig. 3 PDR distribution of CMs during the normal scenario.
Representation of PDR distribution in cluster members (CM1, CM2,
CM3, CM4, and CM5) during the normal scenario (sensor network
does not include jammer). The PDR of CMs: CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and
CM5, is above PDR threshold 74.75, 77, 73.75, and 62.5% with
probabilities 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively
noted that the PDR of CM1, CM2, and CM3 in all the
cases are lesser than the PDR threshold due to the influ-
ence of jammer. But the PDR of CM4 and CM5 in all
the cases are greater than the PDR threshold (because the
members CM4 and CM5 are not jammed).
In Fig. 8, the average PDR of CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4,
and CM5 for different types of jamming (constant, decep-
tive, random, and reactive) with various probabilities is
considered. From Fig. 8, it is evident that theoretically
the constant jammer jams the entire transmission on
the channel, since the constant jammer constantly injects
the data packets on the communication medium. But
in practice, negligible data transmission takes place. The
data packets transmitted by CMs to CH are eradicated
continuously by the constant jammer. Thus, the effect
of jamming by the constant jammer is determined to
Fig. 4 PDR distribution of CMs during various types of jamming with
probability 0.001. Representation of PDR distribution in cluster
members (CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5) during various jamming
with the probability p = 0.001. The PDR of CMs: CM1, CM2, and CM3,
is lesser than the PDR threshold 74.75% and that of CM4 and CM5 is
above PDR threshold 74.75%
Fig. 5 PDR distribution of CMs during various types of jamming with
probability 0.01. Representation of PDR distribution in cluster
members (CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5) during various jamming
with the probability p = 0.01. The PDR of CMs: CM1, CM2, and CM3, is
less than the PDR threshold 77% and that of CM4 and CM5 is above
PDR threshold 77%
be above 90% with respect to the average PDR of var-
ious probabilities. The jamming effectiveness number is
determined based on the averages over the resulting PDR
percentage for the CMs: CM1, CM2, and CM3. The
deceptive jammer jams the data transmission similar to
constant jammer, but the deceptive jammer is aware of the
existing protocol in the network. Therefore, the deceptive
jamming effect is determined to be around 71% with
respect to average PDR of various probabilities. The data
transmission is randomly jammed by the random jammer.
The random jammer sleeps and jams the data transmis-
sion at random time intervals. From the simulation result,
it is noted that the random jamming effect is around
42% with respect to average PDR of various probabilities.
The reactive jammer is also aware of the communication
protocol in the network like the deceptive jammer. The
Fig. 6 PDR distribution of CMs during various types of jamming with
probability 0.05. Representation of PDR distribution in cluster
members (CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5) during various jamming
with the probability p = 0.05. The PDR of CMs: CM1, CM2, and CM3, is
less than the PDR threshold 73.75% and that of CM4 and CM5 is
above PDR threshold 73.75%
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Fig. 7 PDR distribution of CMs during various types of jamming with
probability 0.1. Representation of PDR distribution in cluster members
(CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5) during various jamming with the
probability p = 0.1. The PDR of CMs: CM1, CM2, and CM3, is less than
the PDR threshold 62.5% and that of CM4 and CM5 is above PDR
threshold 62.5%
reactive jammer listens to the transmission medium con-
tinuously and initiates to jam the medium during data
communication. The average effect of reactive jamming is
shown around 80% with respect to various probabilities.
From Fig. 8, it is evident that the constant jammer (with
various probabilities) poses severe security thread than
other jammers. But in reality, the sensor nodes and the
jammers in the sensor network are limited with energy.
Constant jammers will drain the battery quickly because
of continuously injecting the data into the medium. Reac-
tive jammer injects data packet to destroy the original
data packet transmitted by the normal node. In contrast
to constant jammer, the reactive jammer injects the data
packet only when it senses the original data packet in the
medium. Due to this, the lifetime of the reactive jammer
with respect to energy consumption is certainly higher
than the constant jammer. Therefore, from the attackers
Fig. 8 The average PDR distribution of CMs with various types of
jamming with various probabilities. Representation of average PDR
distribution in cluster members (CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and CM5) with
various probabilities 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1
point of view, it is concluded that the reactive jammer
(consumes energy only when the normal node is transmit-
ting the data) is more effective than a constant jammer
with respect to energy constraint.
4.3 Performance evaluation metrics
Generally, the CH identifies whether its members are in
usual or unusual condition. The CH may not identify the
member as in unusual condition or CH may inaccurately
identify the CM as in usual condition. In order to detect
the CMs accurately as in usual condition or in unusual
condition, the detection of CMs may be categorized into
(i) true detection, (ii) false detection, and (iii) undetection.
The true detection is defined as CH that accurately detects
the member as unusual when that member is jammed.
The false detection is defined as CH that wrongly detects
the member as unusual though that member is usual.
The undetection is defined as CH that wrongly detects
the member as usual although the member is actually
jammed.
The factors that are used to compute the performance
metrics, namely true detection ratio (TDR), false detec-
tion ratio (FDR), and undetection ratio (UDR), are given
as follows:
1. True positive indicator (TP) represents the number
of accurately detected jammed members.
2. True negative indicator (TN) represents the number
of accurately detected usual members, but the
members are actually not jammed.
3. False positive indicator (FP) represents that the
members are jammed but they are actually not
jammed.
4. False negative indicator (FN) represents that the
members are not jammed but they are actually
jammed.
5. True positive ratio (TPR) is the number of accurately
detected jammed members to the total number of
members actually jammed.
6. True negative ratio (TNR) is the number of accurately
detected usual members (members who are not
jammed) to the total number of usual members.
7. False positive ratio (FPR) is the number of members
inaccurately detected as jammed to the sum of
members who are detected as jammed and number
of members who are actually not jammed.
8. False negative ratio (FNR) is the number of members
inaccurately detected as usual to the sum of members
who are detected as not jammed and the number of
members who are actually jammed.
In this paper, TDR , FDR , and UDR are computed based
on the parameters TPR, FNR, FPR, respectively. TDR is
defined as the ratio of the number of members that are
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accurately detected by the CH to the number of mem-
bers that are exactly affected by the jammer. The TDR is
computed as follows:
TDR = TP/(TP + FN) (4)
FDR is defined as the ratio of the number of members
that are inaccurately detected by the CH to the number
of members that are not actually affected by the jammer.
That is, a member is in usual condition but it has been
wrongly detected as unusual. The FDR is computed as
follows:
FDR = FP/(FP + TN) (5)
UDR is defined as the ratio of the number of members
that are not detected by the CH to the number of mem-
bers that are actually affected by the jammer. The UDR is
computed as follows:
UDR = FN/(TP + FN) (6)
The JMR is defined as the ratio of the number of mem-
bers successfully jammed by the jammer to the number of
members falling within the coverage range of the jammer
(number of members covered by the jammer). The JMR is
computed as follows:
JMR = SJ/FJ, (7)
where SJ represents number of members successfully
jammed by the jammer and FJ represents number of
members falling within the coverage range of the jammer.
The chi-square test is used to measure the performance
difference between experimental values (from simulation
results) and anticipated values. The chi-square test is
applied after the simulations. A cluster of hundred mem-
bers (CM1 to CM99 and CH21) is considered. The sim-
ulation setup for this scenario is made in such a way that
15 members (CM1 to CM15) are affected by a jammer
and the rest of the CMs are not affected by a jammer. The
degree of freedom is calculated as 2 (as the number of
groups are 3: normal, low, and high), and the level of sig-
nificance is assumed to be 0.05 with the corresponding
table value of 5.9915 for 95% of confidence interval. The
results are shown in Table 11 (result for one of the simula-
tion is considered). In Table 11, CD denotes the members
correctly detected by JDF when the node is jammed, ID
denotes the members who are incorrectly detected as
abnormal by JDF when the node is in normal condition,
and U denotes the members who are incorrectly detected
as normal by JDF when the node is in abnormal condition.
The result passes the chi-square test as the total under
(E − A)2/A is 0, which is lesser than the chi-square table
value (5.991). Hence, there is no difference between the
observed and anticipated values. The level of significance
is 0.05. This states that the reliability of the result is
95%, i.e., the obtained result is considered to be correct
by 95% and the chance of obtained result to be wrong
by 5%. Therefore, the result of the proposed system is
significiantly encouraging.
As discussed before, the PDR threshold value is fixed
as 74.75% (based on the result of T test with the proba-
bility of 99.9). Various types of jamming is launched. The
TDR, FDR, and UDR are determined based on the PDR
threshold (74.75%). The mean TDR and FDR from these
simulations are collected for different jammed members
under various configurations for different types of jam-
mers such as constant, deceptive, random, and reactive
jammers. In the simulation, the configuration is changed
by changing the total number of members in the cluster
as 5, 50, and 100. Figs. 9, 10, and 11 show the values of
TDR, FDR, and UDR for different types of jammers under
various configurations with probability p = 0.001. This
states that the reliability of the result is 99.9%, that is, the
obtained result is considered to be correct by 99.9% and
the chance of obtained result to be wrong by 0.1%.
Similarly, the T test is performed for other probabilities
(p) such as 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. The process of computing
the t value for other probabilities is not included in the
paper due to space constraint. However, the results are
given as follows:
• T test is performed with four samples of PDR
observed from members CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4,
and CM5. The degree of freedom is computed as 3,
and the level of significance is 0.01 with the
corresponding t value being 5.9 for 99% of
confidence interval. The result passes the t test. The t
table value of t test is 5.84. From the observation, it is
Table 11 Chi-square test result for one of the simulations
TDR = FDR = UDR =
GML MinC MbyA (E−A)
2
A CD ID U 100.CD/A 100.ID/A 100.U/A
(E) (A) (%) (%) (%)
High 15 15 0 15 0 0 100 0 0
Normal 20 20 0 20 0 0 100 0 0
Low 65 65 0 65 0 0 100 0 0
Total 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 0
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Fig. 9 TDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.001
noted that the t value (5.9) exceeds the table value
(5.84). This proves that there is significance and the
PDR threshold is fixed as 77%. Similar to the
probability 0.001, the experiment is repeated for the
probability 0.01. The mean TDR and FDR from these
simulations are collected for different jammed
members under various configurations for different
types of jammers such as constant, deceptive,
random, and reactive jammers. In the simulation, the
configuration is changed by changing the total
number of members in the cluster as 5, 50, and 100.
Figs. 12, 13, and 14 show the values of TDR, FDR, and
UDR for different types of jammers under various
configurations with probability p = 0.01. This states
that the reliability of the result is 99%, that is, the
obtained result is considered to be correct by 99%
and the chance of obtained result to be wrong by 1%.
• T test is performed with four samples of PDR
observed from members CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4,
and CM5. The degree of freedom is computed as 3,
and the level of significance is 0.05 with the
corresponding t value being 3.23 for 95% of
confidence interval. The result passes the t test. The t
Fig. 10 FDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.001
Fig. 11 UDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.001
table value of t test is 3.18. From the observation, it is
noted that the t value (3.23) exceeds the table value
(3.18). This proves that there is significance and the
PDR threshold is fixed as 73.75%. Similar to the
probability 0.01, the experiment is repeated for the
probability 0.05. The mean TDR and FDR from these
simulations are collected for different jammed
members under various configurations for different
types of jammers such as constant, deceptive,
random, and reactive jammers. In the simulation, the
configuration is changed by changing the total
number of members in the cluster as 5, 50, and 100.
Figs. 15, 16, and 17 show the values of TDR, FDR, and
UDR for different types of jammers under various
configuration with probability p = 0.05. This states
that the reliability of the result is 95%, that is, the
obtained result is considered to be correct by 95%
and the chance of obtained result to be wrong by 5%.
• T test is performed with four samples of PDR
observed from CMs CM1, CM2, CM3, CM4, and
Fig. 12 TDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.01
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Fig. 13 FDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.01
CM5. The degree of freedom is computed as 3, and
the level of significance is 0.1 with the corresponding
t value being 2.39 for 90% of confidence interval. The
result passes the t test. The t table value of t test is
2.35. From the observation, it is noted that the t value
(2.39) exceeds the table value (2.35). This proves that
there is significance and the PDR threshold is fixed as
62.5 %. Similar to the probability 0.05, the experiment
is repeated for the probability 0.1. The mean TDR and
FDR from these simulations are collected for different
jammed members under various configurations for
different types of jammers such as constant,
deceptive, random, and reactive jammers. In the
simulation, the configuration is changed by changing
the total number of members in the cluster as 5, 50,
and 100. Figs. 18, 19, and 20 show the values of TDR,
FDR, and UDR for different types of jammers under
various configuration with probability p = 0.1. This
Fig. 14 UDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.01
Fig. 15 TDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.05
states that the reliability of the result is 90%, that is,
the obtained result is considered to be correct by 90%
and the chance of obtained result to be wrong by 10%.
Initially, the PDR threshold (PDR Threshold) is fixed
based on the result of the T test discussed in Section 2.5.2.
The PDR Threshold is fixed as 74.75, 77, 73.75, and 62.5%
for the confidence levels at 99.9, 99, 95, and 90%, respec-
tively. The proposed JDF is simulated based on various
PDR Thresholds and RSSI Threshold, for measuring the
performance in terms of performance evaluation metrics
(TDR, FDR, and UDR). From the results, it is observed
that the proposed system with confidence levels at 99.9,
99, and 95% detect all types of jamming and the proposed
system with confidence level at 90% detects constant,
deceptive, and reactive jammings and does not detect
random jamming. It is also noted that among chosen con-
fidence level for simulation, the proposed system with
Fig. 16 FDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.05
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Fig. 17 UDR for different jamming of various configurations of
p = 0.05
confidence level at 99% works well (TDR = 99.8% and
FDR = UDR = 0).
Now, the performance evaluation metrics of the
proposed system is compared for confidence level at
99% with the existing system [8]. From Table 12,
it is noted that the proposed system for confidence
level at 99% works better than the existing system.
The reliability of the proposed system result is 99%.
That is, the obtained result is considered to be cor-
rect by 99% and the chance of obtained result to be
wrong by 1%. The proposed system for confidence level
at 99%.
To the best of our knowledge, none has considered
jammer intrusion detection and jamming detection in the
cluster-based WSN. But research work on jammer and
jamming detection are carried out in other kinds of net-
work such as IEEE 802.11b wireless network [23], IEEE
802.11 network [24], and IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN [25].
This lies as the motivating factor behind the design and
Fig. 18 TDR for different jamming of various configurations of p = 0.1
Fig. 19 FDR for different jamming of various configurations of p = 0.1
implementation of proposed JDF. However, in order to
provide a holistic research insight on jammer and jam-
ming detection, the proposed JDF is compared with recent
research works on jammer and jamming detection in
other modern networks as given in Table 13.
4.4 Energy consumption
Theoretical- and simulation-based energy consumption
analyses of JDF are performed, and these analyses are
bases to evaluate the trade-off within a WSN. The the-
oretical energy consumption analysis incudes (i) analysis
on energy consumption in the normal scenario, (ii) analy-
sis on energy consumption on jammer intrusion detection
(JID), and (iii) analysis on energy consumption on jam-
ming detection (JD).
Analysis on energy consumption based on theoretical
model:
In sensor network, the node’s energy is consumed due
to data packet transmission, data packet reception, and
computations performed by nodes. Theoretical energy
Fig. 20 UDR for different jamming of various configurations of p = 0.1
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Table 12 Comparison of maximum TDR, minimum FDR, and UDR for various jammers for different probabilities and existing system
Probabilities Types of jammer
Constant Deceptive Random Reactive
TDR 99.55 99.35 99.2 99.75
FDR 0 0.5 0.65 0.1
P = 0.001 UDR 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.08
FDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
UDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
TDR 99.88 99.4 99.15 99.45
FDR 0 0.5 0.65 0.1
P = 0.01 UDR 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.08
FDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
UDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
TDR 99.3 99.35 99.7 98.5
FDR 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1
P = 0.05 UDR 0.2 0.25 0 1.3
FDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
UDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
TDR 99.3 99.345 89 99.4
FDR 0.7 0.3 5 0.1
P = 0.1 UDR 0 0.35 4 0.5
FDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
UDR (JMR = 100) 0 0 0 0
Existing TDR 99.5 99.5 99.1 99.25
system (7) FDR (Jnr = 100) 0 0 0 0
Table 13 Comparison of the proposed system with the existing systems in various networks
S.No. Types of network Types of jammer Detection
metrics
True detection False detection Undetection





Yes Not clear Nil
Random Pulse width
Reactive
2 IEEE 802.11 network
[24]
Constant











Deceptive PDR Yes Yes Yes
Random RSSI
Reactive
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consumption is modeled by assuming the energy con-
sumption for packet transmission, reception, and compu-
tation based on [26].
(i) Analysis on energy consumption in normal scenario:
In the proposed system, distance between the CM and
CH, between cluster heads, and between cluster head and
base station (BS) is considered as one hop as shown in
Fig. 1. In general, energy consumed for transmission and
reception of data packets in WSN (EC) is expressed as
follows:
EC = n1Et + n2Er (8)
where Et is the energy in millijoules (mJ) to transmit
a packet over one hop distance, Er is the energy in mJ
needed to receive a packet over one hop distance, n1
represents the total number of data transmitted, and n2
represents the total number of data received.
(ii) Analysis of energy consumption for jammer intrusion
detection component of JDF :
To detect the jammer intrusion, the verification and
validation algorithm uses CHC. The CHC is used for
node authentication. When a new member enters into a
cluster, the CH requests the CHC. So the CHC is trans-
mitted by the member. The total energy consumption for
jammer intrusion detection component (ECJIDC) of JDF
is expressed as follows:
ECJIDC = n1Et + n2Er + N(n1ENt + n2ENr)H + EP
(9)
where N represents the number of data packets transmit-
ted with respect to jammer intrusion detection, ENt is the
energy in mJ to transmit a CHC packet over one hop dis-
tance, ENr is the energy in mJ needed to receive a CHC
packet over one hop distance, EP denotes the energy in
mJ based on computational cost of various modules in
verification and validation algorithm, and H denotes the
number of hops. In the case of jammer intrusion detec-
tion, CM transmits CHC to CH for authentication and the
distance between CM and CH is considered as one hop
distance. Therefore, the value of N and H is considered as
1. Energy consumption due to jammer intrusion detection
component alone excluding energy consumption of regu-
lar data packet communication during normal scenario is
given as follows:
Exclusive Energy Consumption due to JID=ECJIDC−EC
(10)
(iii) Analysis on energy consumption due to jamming
detection component of JDF :
In the auditing algorithm, the behavior of the mem-
bers are determined periodically by using two jamming
detection metrics such as packet delivery ratio (PDR) and
received signal strength indicator (RSSI). Auditing algo-
rithm is implemented in CH. This algorithm computes
the PDR, maximum PDR, and malicious level of CMs
in the cluster periodically. The CH by itself computes
the jamming detection metrics (PDR, RSSI), process, and
makes decision about jammed and normal conditions.
Hence, the CMs are not burdened in computation of jam-
ming detection metrics, processing, and decision-making.
Therefore, in the JD component of the proposed JDF,
the CH consumes energy only to detect the presence of
jamming (processing or computational energy), and the
energy consumption due to data packet communication is
completely ignored. Energy consumed by JD component
(ECJDC) of JDF in joules is expressed as follows:
ECJDC = n1Et + n2Er + H +
M∑
i=1
EPi + JI + JC (11)
where M denotes the number of parameter to be com-
puted by the auditing algorithm (PDR, maximum PDR,
and malicious level), JI represents the energy consump-
tion to identify the presence of jamming, and JC denotes
the energy consumption to classify the type of jamming.
The number of hops, H , is considered as 1. M is consid-
ered as 3 since the auditing algorithm computes only three
parameters viz, PDR, maximum PDR, and malicious level.
Exclusive energy consumption due to JD component of
JDF is given as follows:
Exclusive Energy Consumption due to JD=@ECJDC−EC
(12)
Theoretical energy consumption analysis:
In Fig. 1, the CH21 has to send ten packets to every
CM (total number of packets to be transmitted to its
all CMs is 50). In the normal scenario, the CH receives
acknowledgement for the transmitted packet. Therefore,
in the corresponding cluster, the total number of packets
to be transmitted to the CMs is 50 and total number of
acknowledgement to be received from CMs is 50.
The sensing and communication range of the sensor
node is fixed as 20m, the energy consumption for
data transmission and reception is considered as 0.526
and 0.11mJ/packet, respectively, and the computational
or processing energy consumption is considered as
0.1mJ/module [26].
Using (8), the energy consumption in the normal sce-
nario is computed as follows: EC = 10∗0.526+10∗0.11 =
5.26 + 1.1 = 6.36mJ.
Using (9), total energy consumption for ECJIDC is com-
puted as follows: (it is assumed that the CM5 likes to move
from cluster CH21 to CH22. At this time, CM5 sends
request to join in a new cluster. The new CH demands
CHC from CM5. CM5 provides its CHC to new CH. New
CH processes the CHC and declares whether the CHC is
valid or not), ECJIDC = 10 ∗ 0.526 + 10 ∗ 0.11 + 1 ∗ (2 ∗
0.526 + 2 ∗ 0.11) ∗ 1 + 5 = 12.632mJ.
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Using (10), the exclusive energy consumption due to JID
is computed as follows:
Exclusive Energy Consumption due to JID = 12.632 −
6.36mJ = 6.272mJ.
Using (11), the total energy consumption for ECJDC
is computed as follows. Consider the CH21. CH21 has
to compute the parameters PDR, maximum PDR, and
malicious level. To compute these parameters, separate
modules are present in the auditing algorithm. Jamming
identification is done based on the computed parame-
ter (malicious level). Once the presence of jamming is
detected, then classification of jamming is done with the
help of classification module. ECJDC = 10 ∗ 0.526 + 10 ∗
0.11 + 1 + 0.9 + 0.5 + 0.1 = 8.86mJ.
Using (12), the exclusive energy consumption due to JD
is computed as follows:
ExclusiveEnergyConsumptionduetoJD = 8.86 − 6.36 =
2.5mJ
Theoretically, to illustrate the energy consumption of
CHs without mobility and with mobility, three set of sam-
ples of energy is considered. In Figs. 21 and 22, X-axis
denotes the cluster head and Y -axis denotes energy in mJ.
The variety of color bars in Fig. 21 indicates the energy
consmption of CHs due to JIDC component and JDC
component without mobility. The simulation setup for the
scenario (without mobility) is made in such a way that
data communication is done between CH and CMs. At
this time, CH by itself computes the jamming detection
metrics to detect the presence of jamming in JIDC. From
Fig. 21, it is evident that the energy consumption of CHs
in the normal scenario and JIDC are same (that is, 6.36mJ)
and JDC is accurately 8.86mJ. The variety of color bars in
Fig. 22 indicates the energy consumption of CHs due to
the JIDC component (when a CM desires to move from
one cluster to another) and JDC component with mobil-
ity. The simulation setup for the scenario (with mobility)
is made in such a way that data communication is done
between CH and CMs. At this time, the CM5 desires
to move from the present cluster to another cluster and
Fig. 21 Theoretical energy consumption of CHs without mobility
Fig. 22 Theoretical energy consumption of CHs with mobility
CH by itself computes the jamming detection metrics to
detect the presence of jamming in JIDC. From Fig. 22, it
is evident that the energy consumption of CHs in normal,
JIDC, and JDC are accurately 6.36, 12.632, and 8.86mJ,
respectively.
The proposed JDF detects the jammer intrusion when
a CM likes to move from the present cluster to another;
also, it detects and declares the presence of jamming
periodically say every 3 s. Therefore, the JDF consumes
12.632mJ to detect the jammer intrusion and consumes
8.86mJ to detect the presence of jamming. The simulation
is done for 600 s as discussed in Section 4.2. At the outset,
the simulation is carried out without mobility. After that
the simulation is continued with mobility. (Initially, the
constant jammer is launched then set of samples is consid-
ered without mobility and with mobility in the network.
Similarly, the simulation is repeated for other types of
jammer).
To illustrate the energy consumption of CHs without
mobility andwithmobility, a set of three samples of energy
is considered. In Figs. 23 and 24,X-axis denotes the cluster
heads and Y -axis denotes energy in mJ. The variety of
color bars in Fig. 23 indicates the energy consumption of
Fig. 23 Simulation-based energy consumption of CHs without
mobility
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Fig. 24 Simulation-based energy consumption of CHs with mobility
CHs due to JIDC component and JDC component without
mobility. The simulation setup for the scenario (without
mobility) is made in such a way that data communica-
tion is done between CH and CMs. At this time, CH by
itself computes the jamming detection metrics to detect
the presence of jamming in JIDC. From Fig. 23, it is evi-
dent that the energy consumption of CHs in the normal
scenario is 1272mJ, JIDC is 1372mJ (since it involves in
generation, distribution, and updation of CHC) and JDC
is around 1772 mJ (since every 3 s, it detects for the pres-
ence or absence of jamming). The variety of color bars
in Fig. 24 indicates the energy consumption of CHs due
to JIDC component (when a CM desires to move from
one cluster to another) and JDC component with mobil-
ity. The simulation setup for the scenario (with mobility)
is made in such a way that data communication is done
between CH and CMs. At this time, the CM desires to
move from present cluster to another cluster and CH
by itselft computes the jamming detection metrics to
detect the presence of jamming in JIDC. From Fig. 24, it
is evident that the energy consumption of CHs in nor-
mal, JIDC, and JDC are around 1272, 2400, and 1772mJ,
respectively.
5 Related work
There are several attacks in the sensor networks which are
categorized into routing attacks and data traffic attacks.
The data traffic attacks are classified as jamming, worm-
hole, selective forwarding, sinkhole, and sybil attack [27,
28]. The jamming attack is focused in this paper.
Four types of jamming models, namely constant, decep-
tive, random, and reactive jammer, are presented in [7].
These jamming models are used in the wireless networks
and are experimented for detecting the presence of jam-
ming. The invented jamming detection mechanism was
experimented by using MICA2 mote platform. Initially,
the jamming detection metrics such as signal strength,
carrier sensing time, packet delivery ratio, or packet sent
ratio were used independently to detect the presence of
jamming. It is noted from the experiments that one of
the jamming detection metrics by itself cannot detect the
presence of jamming. Hence, the consistency checkmech-
anism is devised in order to enhance the detection. This
uses packet delivery ratio to detect the presence of jam-
ming and consistency check to assess whether the packet
delivery ratio is affected by jamming. The signal strength
or location information is used as a consistency check.
The overheads in this mechanism are (i) the nodes are
heavily loaded due to collection of neighbor node’s metric
and decision-making are done at node level; (ii) the col-
lected neighbor node’s metrics are stored and processed
for decision-making; therefore, this leads to increased
time and space complexity; (iii) communication overhead
due to collection of neighbor node’s metrics to make deci-
sion; (iv) if a node does not have neighbor node, then the
presence of jamming cannot be determined precisely; and
(v) the consistency check uses location information that
entails GPS hardware or localization techniques.
The jamming detection mechanism used packets
dropped per terminal and signal-to-noise ratio or bad
packet ratio as jamming detection metrics to detect
whether a node is affected due to jammer or not [8]. All
the nodes in the network have to compute the jamming
detection metrics and send it to the base station at a reg-
ular interval. Then, the base station makes decision about
jammed or non-jammed condition. The overheads are (i)
all the nodes in the network have to send the computed
metrics to the base station for decision-making; thus, it
leads to communication overhead, and (ii) this mecha-
nism does not support mobility since the nodes are fixed
in the network.
Two jamming detection algorithms are proposed to
detect the presence of different jamming attacks in
the sensor network [9]. The fundamental algorithm
is referred as basic jamming detection mechanism, in
which bad packet ratio, packet delivery ratio, and energy
consumption metrics are used to determine the existence
of jamming. In order to determine this, these metric val-
ues are compared with their corresponding thresholds. If
the metric values are smaller than their threshold, then
there is an existence of jamming. Otherwise, there is no
jamming. Secondary algorithm referred as advanced jam-
ming detection mechanism uses additional variables and
flags in order to improve the fundamental algorithm in
detecting jamming attacks. The limitations are (i) the
computation of metrics and decision-making are made
at node level and (ii) every node collects its neighbor
node’s metrics, stores, and makes decision for determin-
ing the presence of jamming. Therefore, this leads to
increased time, space complexity, and communication
overhead. A novel jamming detection approach is pro-
posed to detect the presence of reactive jamming attacks.
This approach used bit error rate and received signal
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strength to detect the individual packet bit errors. In [10],
predetermine knowledge, error correcting code or error
detecting code, and wired node chains are discussed. The
proposed approach are assessed statistically and experi-
mented on COTS BT nodes and Tmote Sky node. How-
ever, this approach can detect only reactive jamming and
cannot detect other jamming attacks.
The wireless sensor networks require a mechanism to
detect the presence of jamming and secure the nodes from
jamming since the sensor nodes are employed in dynamic
environment. In [16], the jamming attacks and securing
sensor networks from jamming are reviewed. The mul-
timodal method was proposed to detect the presence
of jamming. Two avoidance approaches were presented.
The first entails the sensor networks tuning its operating
frequencies, and the second approach is appropriate for
mobile sensor networks and nodes are relocated them-
selves. The competition approach employs power control
and code throttling to compete with the interferer by
adjusting resources. In [17], the vulnerabilities of the wire-
less sensor network, various types of jamming attacks,
and countermeasures against jamming were discussed.
It is also classified into proactive, reactive, and mobile-
agent-based countermeasures. In [18], a minimax robust
detection framework is proposed to monitor the node’s
misbehavior in the MAC layer. It is discussed how an
invader masks the event by jamming part of the nodes in
the network [19]. In order to prevent the sensor nodes
from the attacker, a suitable model is proposed, and it uses
probabilistic wormholes that depend on wires, frequency
hopping, and uncoordinated channel hopping. The moni-
tor nodes are employed in the sensor network that detects
the presence of jammer [20]. If the monitor node iden-
tifies the jammer node, then it sends a warning message
beyond the jamming region. The proposed approach in
[21] admits a receiver to detect the jamming, if it receives
primary message excluding secondary message. The code
tree approach offers input to the physical layer in order
to evade the jammers. From the simulation results, it is
observed that the jamming is effectively mitigated in the
broadcast wireless system. And the monitors are deployed
in wireless sensor networks and they employ an optimal
sequence hypothesis test to detect the jamming condition
[22]. Amethod is proposed to calculate the optimal strate-
gies for jamming attacks and for securing network. Addi-
tionally pareto-dominated and risk-dominated strategies
are proposed and numerical experiment is achieved.
The detection of jamming in the existing approaches is
node centric or BS centric [7–10] where the individual
nodes involve in collecting and processing the respec-
tive node’s metric and neighbor nodes’ metric such as
packet send ratio (PSR) [7], packet delivery ratio (PDR) [7],
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) [8], bad packet ratio (BPR) [8,
9], energy consumption amount (ECA) [9], and bit error
rate (BER) [10]. These metrics are used either individually
or collectively to make the decision about “jammed situa-
tion” or “non-jammed situation”. Collectively, the metrics
PSR, PDR, BPR, and BER are termed as jamming induc-
tion metrics (JIM). In the proposed system, the metrics
PDR and RSSI are combinely considered to be the JIM
metrics. The overhead in the existing approaches are (i)
the complete processing and decision-making are done
at the node level causing elevated time and space com-
plexity (because collecting, storing, and processing JIM
induce additional overhead); (ii) the presence of jamming
is not detected precisely, if the node has no neighbor
(because node would not have sufficient knowledge of
neighbor nodes JIM, to determine the presence of jam-
ming); and (iii) communication overhead (because JIM
has to be collected from the neighbor nodes which injects
additional traffic into the system). Therefore, a novel jam-
mer detection framework with a nominal overhead and
an acceptable detection rate is in need to be devised. This
paper addresses this research gap by introducing a three-
step novel jammer detection framework. In addition to
jammer intrusion detection, jamming detection is also
carried out in this paper.
6 Conclusions
A novel jammer detection framework is proposed to
detect the presence of jammer and jamming in the cluster-
based wireless sensor networks. The proposed jammer
detection framework comprises the following three key
elements: (i) The metric PDR is combined with the metric
RSSI for jamming detection; (ii) statistical tests are per-
formed to find out the threshold of detection metrics and
to classify various types of jamming; and (iii) a three-step
framework such as verification, validation, and auditing to
detect both jammer intrusion and jamming. The proposed
JDF performs well against the existing jamming detection
approaches. The proposed jammer detection framework
is simulated in NS2 simulator. The simulation is carried
out to determine the TDR, FDR, and UDR for various
confidence levels at 99.9, 99, 95, and 90%. The proposed
system with the confidence level at 99% performs better
than the proposed system with various confidence levels
at 99.9, 95, and 90%. Finally, the proposed system is com-
pared with the existing system, and it is concluded that
proposed system with confidence level at 99% performs
better than the existing system. The future work direction
includes determining the position of jammer node in the
cluster and posterior action on jamming.
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